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I NTRODUCTION

Coercive interrogation is now a live subject, thanks to 9/11. At one time,
coercive interrogation played a role only in philosophical disputes about
consequentialism, in which scholars asserted or denied that the police could
interrogate an individual in order to extract the location of a ticking nuclear
bomb. None of the participants in those debates seriously considered the
possibility that coercive interrogation could be justified except in extreme
circumstances never likely to be met. Today, U.S. officials appear to engage
in coercive interrogation or something very similar to it; so do other western
governments; and the possibility that coercive interrogation may be justified
in nonremote circumstances has entered mainstream debate. 1 The task for
legal scholars at this point is to understand how this practice fits into legal
norms and traditions, and how it ought to be regulated.
Let us define some terms, and delimit the topic. "Coercive interroga
tion," we will say, involves (1) the application of force, physical or mental
2
(2) in order to extract information (3) necessary to save others. Coercive
interrogation can range from the mild to the severe. At some point of sever
ity, coercive interrogation becomes a species of "torture," which is flatly
3
prohibited by domestic and international law. Coercive interrogation and

I.
See Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in
the Wake of September I I, 8 1 Tux. L. REV. 201 3 (2003). Levinson's important paper supplies evi

dence for the first two claims in text and constitutes evidence for the third. For other recent debate
about torture, see TORTURE, A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (collecting major essays
on the practical, philosophical and moral considerations surrounding the historical and contempo
rary use of torture). For a recent media report, see Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Opens Inquiry Into
Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A20.
2. The last clause excludes the use of coercive interrogation to extract confessions to be
used in later prosecution. We define coercive interrogation strictly as a police practice used to pre
vent harm to others, rather than as a prosecutorial tool.
3. The principal legal sources of the prohibition on "torture" are: the United Nations Con
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
IO, 1 984, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 5 1 ) at 1 97, U.N. Doc. N39/5 1 ( 1 984),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 ( 1 984) , modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 ( 1 985); the U.S. Senate reservations
to the convention, which adopted a more restrictive definition of "torture," U.S. Reservations, Decla
rations, and Understandings and Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment Il( l )(a), 1 36 CONG. REC. 36, 1 93 ( 1 990); 1 8 U.S.C. § 2340A
(2000) (criminalizing torture committed outside the United States by U.S. nationals and persons
later found in the United States); Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1 350 (2000) (providing
a civil remedy against torturers acting under color of the law of a foreign nation); and Supreme
Court decisions holding that "police interrogation practices that severely infringe on a suspect's
mental or physical autonomy violate the due process clause regardless of whether they produce
statements that are admitted against the suspect." John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option ?, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 751 (2002). In sum,
"[t]orture is prohibited by law throughout the United States." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE ( 1 999), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_ rights/torture_articles.html, cited in Parry & White, supra, at
753. A complication, which we will ignore, is the claim by some Bush administration officials that
statutory and treaty restrictions on certain forms of coercive interrogation should be narrowly con
strued, and might even be unconstitutional to the extent they prohibit the President from using coercive
interrogation in the exercise of the Commander in Chief power. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 3 1-39 (Aug.
1 , 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee801 02mem.pdf; WoRKJNG GROUP
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torture are thus partially overlapping concepts; neither is a proper subset of
the other. Mild coercive interrogation does not amount to legal "torture,"
which requires that a threshold of severity be met. And there are forms of
torture that are not coercive interrogation-for example, when torture is
used as a means of political intimidation or oppression, indeed for any pur
pose other than extracting information necessary to save third-party lives.
Our interest is in the overlapping area of these two concepts: coercive inter
rogation that (by virtue of its severity) counts as torture. Henceforth, we will
use "coercive interrogation" to denote this subset.
Given these stipulations, our inquiry is normative. We ask what legal re
gime should govern coercive interrogation. Should it ever be permissible? If
so, what legal rules should be used to sort permissible from impermissible
cases? Among legal academics, a near consensus has emerged: coercive in
terrogation must be kept "illegal," but nonetheless permitted in certain
4
circumstances. How is this trick accomplished? There are two popular sug
gestions. First, interrogators can use the necessity defense, which would
permit government agents to argue in specific cases that violating the laws
against coercive interrogation was necessary to discharge their duty to pro
tect the public from an imminent terrorist threat. Second, interrogators can
throw themselves at the mercy of the political process, and seek a pardon, or
a favorable use of prosecutorial discretion, or some similar political immu
nization. The idea is to make coercive interrogation such an unattractive
option for officials-they will be personally liable unless the strict condi
tions of necessity are met or the political process smiles on them-that they
will use it only as a last resort. And this regulatory structure is meant to have
an expressive dimension: maintaining the "illegality" of coercive interroga
tion expresses a moral commitment to human dignity and autonomy, while
the possibility of defenses and pardons allows its use where appropriate.
The whole idea is puzzling. Police are allowed to use deadly force in or
der to prevent dangerous suspects from harming other people. Killing a
person is also a serious harm to dignity and autonomy; although we will see
arguments holding that coercive interrogation is worse than killing in some
respects, there are other respects in which killing is worse than coercive in
terrogation. To prevent officials from engaging in unjustified killings,
governments take the conventional route of enacting laws that describe the
conditions under which a police officer may use deadly force, making the

REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL
HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ccr
ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf.
4. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of "Dirty Hands", in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note I, at 86-87; Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic
Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1 48 1 , 1 520 (2004); Levinson, supra note
I, at 2048; Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION,
supra note I, at 297-98; Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 1 24 ( 1 978). Exceptions to this
view-scholars who think law should permit coercive interrogation under some circumstances
include Alan M. Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 1 5 6-60 (2002) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ,
WHY TERRORISM WORKS]; Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 lsR. L. REV. 280
( 1 989).
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police liable only if they violate these rules in bad faith. Why shouldn't the
same system be used for coercive interrogation? Or, conversely, why not
prohibit police killings on the theory that such a prohibition would ensure
that police would kill only when they anticipate that, after they are charged
for murder, they can successfully plead the necessity defense or obtain a
pardon?
Or consider the use of force during war. The laws and usages of war
permit soldiers to kill other soldiers, and civilians as well. Although the kill
ing of civilians is generally regarded as a moral evil, it is justified and
permitted when civilian deaths are not disproportionate given a legitimate
5
military target. If governments can authorize the killing of civilians in order
to accomplish legitimate military objectives-which are all means to the end
of national security-why can't government authorize coercive interrogation
for the same purpose? Or, conversely, why not prohibit the killing of civil
ians and require soldiers to seek a pardon or some other form of political
forgiveness, before or afa�r they.are tried for murder?
In short, the view that coercive interrogation should remain illegal as
sumes that coercive interrogation is special in a way that distinguishes it
from police killings and other serious harms that officials are licensed to
inflict; but what makes coercive interrogation special?
The answer, in our view, is that coercive interrogation is not special at
all. If it is agreed that coercive interrogation is justified in certain circum
stances, even narrow circumstances, there is no sense in treating it as
"illegal" but subject to ex post political or legal defenses. It should be made
legal, albeit subject to numerous legal protections-again, in this way like
police shootings, wartime killings, preventive detentions, capital punish
ment, and other serious harms. The law should treat coercive interrogation
the way it typically treats coercive governmental practices. Such practices
are subject to a standard set of regulations defined ex ante: punishment of
officials who use these instruments without a good justification, official
immunity when they are used in good faith, various restrictions on the type
6
of instrument that may be used, ex ante protections such as warrants, and so
forth. Our argument is that coercive interrogation should be treated in the
same way.
Part I provides a brief and selective overview of the first-order philoso
phical issues. Our purpose here is to delimit the topic in two critical ways.
First, we bracket and ignore the claim that coercive interrogation is deon
tologically impermissible per se, whatever the facts. With a very few
exceptions, this is a view nobody holds; most mainstream philosophers
both consequentialists and deontologists-agree that coercive interrogation
may be morally justified under certain conditions. Second, we outline the
rule-consequentialist view that the harms of coercive interrogation are so
great, the occasions for its justified use so infrequent, and the risks of deci-

5.

See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1 945, at 323 ( 1 994).

6. The idea of ex ante warrants for torture is taken from Alan Dershowitz. See DERSHOW
ITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 4.
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sionmaker error so high, that coercive interrogation should never be permis
sible. The rule-consequentialist view turns on empirical and institutional
premises that we discuss in Parts II and III. The only philosophical point is
that, for either deontologists or consequentialists who believe that coercive
interrogation can sometimes be permissible, there is no philosophical justi
fication for thinking that coercive interrogation should be considered
special, and regulated differently from the other serious, coercive harms that
government inflicts.
Part II addresses second-order empirical and institutional arguments for
treating coercive interrogation as special in the legal system (that is, regulat
ing coercive interrogation by a different legal regime than applies to other
serious harms government may inflict). These arguments rely on various
tropes of second-order argument-rules versus standards, slippery slopes,
institutional failure, corruption, and so forth-that in this case tum out to
rest on implausible empirical premises. Our more precise point, however, is
that if these arguments were accepted for coercive interrogation, many other
common practices would have to be prohibited as well-for example, the
shooting of armed suspects.
In Part III, we argue that banning a practice and then asking officials to
engage in it (when justified) and ask for public forgiveness is not a plausible
strategy for giving officials the right incentives. All of the rule of law rea
sons for creating a set of ex ante regulations that govern official conduct
rather than regulating official conduct ex post-apply as much to coercive
interrogations as to other forms of law enforcement. Moreover, a regime of
ex ante illegality and ex post license is conceptually unsustainable. If offi
cials and citizens know that ex post defenses and forgiveness are available,
they will factor their knowledge into their understanding of what the law is,
diluting the material and expressive effects of the "ban" on coercive interro
gation. Part III also provides our proposed framework for regulating
coercive interrogation. It emphasizes three elements: (1) rules that state
what is permitted and what is not permitted, (2) immunity for officials who
obey the rules and punishment for those who violate the rules, (3) ex ante
regulations such as warrants.
If coercive interrogation is not special, why is it so often swept up in a lar
ger condemnation of "torture"? Part IV speculates briefly about why coercive
interrogation is taboo. Possible mechanisms include faulty generalization that
condemns coercive interrogation by reference to morally indefensible torture,
and by reference to salient historical episodes; the reliance on moral heuris
tics; and widespread herding or judgment falsification, the former causing
individuals to condemn coercive interrogation because others do so, the latter
causing them to condemn coercive interrogation in public even if they pri
vately approve it in some circumstances. A brief conclusion follows.
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I. FIRST-ORDER CONSIDERATIONS: MORAL LIMITS
ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION

Coercive interrogation is a stock subject in moral reasoning. We will
outline some standard philosophical positions about coercive interrogation,
put some off the table, and argue that the remainder tum crucially upon sup
pressed empirical

and institutional premises,

rather than

the sort

of

conceptual claims that fall within the philosopher's distinctive expertise.
Our aim is to set up the discussion in Parts II and III, in which we criticize
the empirical and institutional premises necessary to sustain the view that
coercive interrogation should be regulated differently than other serious co
ercive harms.
Let us begin by looking at the following standard views; we will offer
some brief remarks on each.
A. On Deontological Grounds, Coercive Interrogation
Is Flatly Impermissible

One might hold that coercive interrogation is absolutely impermissible,
as a violation of rights rooted in human dignity or autonomy. This position
is held by very few moral philosophers, if any. Here the ticking-bomb hy
potheticals are important: while it is possible to argue that such cases are so
rare that they should be ignored by a rule-consequentialist calculus ex ante,
an argument we consider below, it is fanatical to argue on deontological
grounds that rights against coercive interrogation should not be overridden
to prevent serious harms to others. That position denies that there can ever
be such a thing as a justified violation of rights, or a necessary evil. Thomas
Nagel seems to offer a brief defense of absolutism, saying that in standard
cases where A sacrifices or harms B to save C, A can justify his conduct to
7
B; but in the case of torture, no such justification is possible. But this view
is a nonstarter, even on its own terms, for Nagel is equivocating about what
"torture" means. If coercive interrogation that aims to save lives is at issue,
rather than sheer sadistic cruelty, the structure of justification tracks the
8
standard cases of harming B in order to save C.
9
Put differently, coercive interrogation presents a "tragic choice." A view
holding that coercive interrogation is sometimes permissible need not deny
7. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 1 7 (Marshall
Cohen et al. eds., 1 974 ).
8.

Levinson, supra note I, at 2032.

9. Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, EcONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001 ) . W here tragic choices are involved, Nussbaum suggests, decisionmakers should at a minimum take pains to commemorate the values, rights, or interests that are
overridden in the service of other commitments. That commemoration can presumably occur in a
variety of ways, from compensatory payments to public apologies and memorials. Nussbaum also
suggests that decisionmakers should think dynamically, with a view to anticipating and reducing the
number of future occasions that present tragic choices. We fully agree, and see nothing inconsistent
with our views in that insight.

·
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that coercive interrogation is a grave moral evil; of course it is. But some
times evils, even grave ones, are also necessary. The absolutist deontological
view fails to come to grips with the inevitability of tragic choices. In what
follows, then, we will put the absolutist deontological view off the table.
Anyone who genuinely holds it may ignore our argument, but we do not
think there are many such people.
B. On Deontological Grounds, Coercive Interrogation Is Impermissible
Except to Prevent "Catastrophic Harms"

Position Two is far more common. Charles Fried argues, as have many
others, that it is permissible to kill an innocent person to save a whole nation
from annihilation. IO If so, coercive interrogation would be permissible a for
tiori in those circumstances.
But why only those circumstances? Let us motivate the puzzle by imag
ining that a catastrophe principle governs the standard practice in which
police officers may use necessary force, including lethal force, against per
sons who threaten harm to others. In this imagined regime, government
officials may kill one person only to save (say) one thousand other people.
No legal system adopts such a regime, nor is there any obvious reason to
11
recommend it. Standardly the permissible ratio is 1 to 1: where relevant
restrictions are met, government may kill A to save B, not merely one thou
sand Bs. Obviously we can add further specification to either the coercive
interrogation case or the extrajudicial-killing case: we might require that the
threatened harm be "imminent," that the force used be no more than neces
sary, and so on. What is quite mysterious, however, is why the sheer
catastrophic size of the threatened harm should matter. The obvious alterna
tive is to say that the harm prevented must simply be greater than the harm
inflicted. It will not do to say that "harms cannot be aggregated across indi
viduals" or "we must take seriously the differences between persons." The
catastrophe exception is already in the business of aggregating harms across
persons. Oddly, however, the catastrophe exception builds in a threshold
below which the harms are of insufficient weight to override deontological
restrictions, and above which they are sufficiently weighty to do so.

12

JO.

CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 1 0 ( 1978).

1 1.

We bracket the question whether the catastrophe threshold is best understood as a ratio,

as opposed to some other sort of function. See Larry Alexander,

Deontology at the Threshold, 37

SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 898-900 (2000).
1 2.

Michael Moore responds to this point in the following way:

[T]he worry may be that any point we pick for a threshold beyond which consequences deter
mine the rightness of action may seem arbitrary . ... [But) this is no more than the medieval
worry of how many stones make a heap. Our uncertainty whether it takes 3, or 4, or 5, etc.,

does not justify us in thinking there are no such things as heaps.Similarly, preventing the tor
ture of two innocents does not justify my torturing one, but destruction of an entire city does.
Moore,

supra note 4, at 332. Moore's point would be responsive if the question were a linguistic and

conceptual one: how many stones make a "heap," and how many deaths make a "catastrophe." It is
not responsive to the different question we raise in text: why, as a matter of substantive morality,
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What typically animates a catastrophe exception is a complex of empiri
cal and institutional considerations: the moral theorist is worried about the
decisionmakers who will assess whether coercive interrogation is justified,
and about the collateral effects of licensing those decisionmakers to make
those very decisions. In this sense, the deontologists who build in a catas
trophe exception are often second-order consequentialists with particular
13
institutional sensibilities. They do not want to prescribe fanatical respect
for rights in scary cases, but they also worry that the exception will expand
so as to swallow the rule; they are worried about institutional and empirical
phenomena like slippery slopes and the effects on public attitudes of permit
ting coercive interrogation. Such worries are perfectly sensible in principle,
although we argue in Parts II and III that they are much overblown in fact,
and cannot justify distinctive treatment of coercive interrogation. This com
plex

of

institutional

concerns,

moreover,

is

not

one

about

which

philosophers as such have anything distinctive to say.
Consider Henry Shue's famous argument against the moral permissibil
14
On this view, the central evil of torture-what makes it

ity of torture.

worse than extrajudicial killing of a menacing criminal, or (Shue's compari
son case) the killing of enemy combatants-is that torture violates the
15
"prohibition against assault upon the defenseless." Torture is worse than
killing, from the standpoint of concern with dignity and autonomy, because
torture "fail[s] to satisfy even [the] weak constraint of being a 'fair fight.'

"16

This is slippery moral philosophy, even without regard to the offsetting
benefits of coercive interrogation. Torture is worse than, say, killing enemies
or armed criminals because the tortured captive is defenseless (ex post, at
least). But killing enemies or armed criminals is worse than torture on an
other margin: killing, unlike torture, utterly extinguishes the victim and
forever denies him any future possibility of exercising autonomy or enjoy
ing human dignity. The victim of coercive interrogation may not get a fair
fight, but at least he lives to fight another day. Shue has picked out the di
mensions that put torture in the worst light so he can argue that it is worse
there should be any such catastrophe threshold in the first place. Why exactly do the deontologists
want to say that saving a mere, say, two or three lives does not justify a single act of coercive inter
rogation? Moore's final sentence restates the catastrophe view, but does nothing to justify it.

1 3.

We do not claim that only institutional considerations can justify a threshold-based ap

proach-for example, a norm against killing that can be overridden to save one hundred lives, but
not two lives. A strictly first-order moral justification for such thresholds might be that the deonto
logical injunction not to kill does not have infinite weight, and at some point is overbalanced by
other moral obligations.

See Moore, supra note 4 (arguing that consequences always count, even

below the catastrophe threshold, but that consequences are outweighed by the deontological prohibi
tion unless and until the threshold is reached-just as a buildup of water will eventually overspill a
dam);

see also SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 78-84 (Norman Daniels & Keith Lehrer eds.,

1 998).

For acute first-order criticisms of this sort of justification for the threshold approach, see

Alexander,

supra note 1 1 . Our narrower claim is just that, in fact, many opponents of coercive inter

rogation who subscribe to some sort of threshold-based approach tend to do so because of the
second-order institutional and empirical concerns discussed in

14.

Shue,

supra note 4 , a t 1 25-30.

1 5.

Id. at 1 25.

1 6.

Id. at 1 30.

Part II.
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than other, commonplace practices. The opposite tack would be to pick out
the dimensions that put torture in a better light than other, commonplace
practices. Neither approach seems obviously superior.
Still, what is of interest for our purposes here is that Shue is reluctantly
willing to entertain exceptions. "[T]he avoidance of assaults upon the de
fenseless is not the only, or even in all cases an overriding, moral
17
Shue then adduces a string of brief empirical and institu

consideration."

tional arguments against permitting coercive interrogation. First, it will be
difficult to define the limited set of conditions under which coercive interro
gation

would

be

permitted.

Second,

such

limiting

conditions

will

predictably be violated even if they can be defined, because all torture has a
18
"metastatic tendency." "[A]ny practice of torture one set in motion would
gain enough momentum to burst any bonds and become a standard operat
ing procedure. . . . If it were ever permitted under any conditions, the
19
temptation to use it increasingly would be very strong."
The natural conclusion to these empirical and institutional concerns
would be a flat prohibition on coercive interrogation, a prohibition justified
on rule-consequentialist grounds. We take up that possibility shortly. Shue
flinches from this implication, however, concluding in the end that the best
legal regime would both "prohibit" coercive interrogation ex ante and yet
also contain some sort of ex post mechanism for allowing justified interro
gation to escape punishment: "The torturer should be in roughly the same
position as someone who commits civil disobedience. . . . If the situation
approximates those in the imaginary examples in which torture seems pos
20
sible to justify, a judge can surely be expected to suspend the sentence."
But the last idea makes the account more puzzling than ever. Given
Shue's pessimism about the possibility of defining circumstances under
which interrogation should be permitted, how can law define the circum
stances in which the judge should suspend the sentence? Or is the judge's
decision to suspend the sentence ex post a wholly discretionary exercise?
On Shue's empirical premises, why will not the anticipated availability of ex
post relief inexorably expand into a general legal blessing for coercive inter
rogation? In what sense is coercive interrogation even "illegal" in such a
regime? On a Holmesian account of law, what matters is that the interroga
tor will not, in the end, go to jail. Most striking of all is that Shue's whole
discussion of justified interrogation is untethered from moral theory, his area
of presumptive expertise. The latter part of Shue's argument is entirely em
pirical, but Shue gives the reader little beyond a set of stylized assumptions

1 7.

Id. at 1 37.

1 8.

Id. at 143.

1 9.

ld. at 1 4 1 .

20.

Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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about what the legal, political and social effects of interrogation simply
21
must be.
C. On Rule-Consequentialist Grounds, Coercive
Interrogation Is Impermissible

The deontological parts of Shue's argument establish a moral presump
tion against coercive interrogation, subject to a consequentialist override;
the subsequent move, one that Shue introduces on the quiet, is a prediction
22
about the costs and benefits of coercive interrogation across a range of
cases. Here all views short of strict deontology-both ordinary consequen
tialism and the modified deontological position that admits a catastrophe
exception-must assess the first-order and second-order consequences of
23
coercive mterrogation.
•

•

•

Putting aside Shue's modified deontological view, the assessment of
consequences can proceed in either an act-consequentialist or a rule
24
consequentialist framework. For act-consequentialists, the important issue
is whether the benefits of coercive interrogation exceed the costs in
particular cases. Rule-consequentialists, by contrast, ask which (set of) rules
about coercive interrogation will produce the greatest net benefits. We have
already

seen

the

straightforward

act-consequentialist

argument

for

permitting coercive interrogation, especially in the standard ticking-bomb
hypotheticals

discussed

above,

so

we

will

focus

here

on

the rule

consequentialist alternative. We address here the second-order arguments for
adopting a flat rule-consequentialist ban on interrogation, and find those
arguments implausible. In Parts II and III we proceed to ask whether there is
any good reason to have a legal regime that differs from the moral regime.

2 1 . For his large propositions about the nature and effects of torture, Shue cites two docu
ments from Amnesty International. See Shue, supra note 4.
22. Here and throughout, we mean nothing philosophically contentious by the terms "cost"
and "benefit." Any consequentialist view needs a value theory that labels some consequences as
good, others as bad; we label the good consequences "benefits" and the bad consequences "costs."
(Note that, as discussed below, violations of rights might themselves count as bads, to be compared
to other goods and bads). In particular, we do not mean to invoke cost-benefit analysis in the techni
cal sense; we do not suggest that costs and benefits must be monetized through a willingness-to-pay
measure.
23. The distinction between deontology and consequentialism does not track the distinction
between rights-based and welfarist moral theories. One may hold a consequentialist view in which
the effects of actions on rights are themselves among the consequences to be evaluated, in which
case the welfare consequences of actions are not the only consequences of interest. See Amartya
Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & Pue. AFF. 3 ( 1 982). This possibility is orthogonal to our discus
sion here, but nothing we say is inconsistent with it. The non-welfarist consequentialist, who counts
rights violations as bads, either does or does not admit some rate of tradeoff between the goal of
avoiding rights violations and other goals. If the rate of tradeoff is zero, we will label the position
"deontological," strictly to simplify our terminology. If there is some positive rate of tradeoff, we
label the position "consequentialist," again for simplicity. In the latter case, rights violations count
as a "cost" in the sense defined above, and are folded into the cost-benefit calculus.
24. There is also a possible motive-consequentialist approach, on which actors attempt to
develop the character or disposition that will tend to produce the actions with the best overall conse
quences. We will ignore this variant in what follows.
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We suggest that there

is

none;

the legal

system

should

authorize

interrogation in some narrow range of circumstances, suitably defined and
regulated ex ante.
The rule-consequentialist argument against coercive interrogation em
phasizes second-order considerations. Perhaps cases in which coercive
interrogation is justified to prevent greater harms are in fact extremely rare;
perhaps front-line moral decisionmakers would be prone to commit error by
using coercive interrogation in cases where its costs outweigh its benefits;
perhaps there are important dynamic effects, such as the risk of a slippery
slope from tightly regulated coercive interrogation to widespread casual tor
ture.

On

this

approach,

coercive

interrogation

is

declared

morally

impermissible on an ex ante cost-benefit calculus, not because there are no
cases in which coercive interrogation would be justified from an ex post
perspective-the rule-consequentialist agrees that there are-but because it
is predictable ex ante that licensing decisionmakers to attempt to identify
such cases will do more harm than good. We comment on the empirical
merits of similar second-order arguments in Parts II and III, suggesting that
arguments for prohibiting all coercive interrogation because of concerns
about the decisional capacities of officials in the legal system are unduly
pessimistic. Here we will confine ourselves to some remarks about the pre
suppositions of the rule-consequentialist approach.
It is important to acknowledge that a rule-consequentialist prohibition
on coercive interrogation might tum out to be correct, in light of the facts.
The great strength of this approach is that it cannot, by its nature, be ruled
out of bounds in the abstract. Everything depends on the actual values of the
second-order variables that the rule-consequentialist argument identifies.
Yet it is equally important to recognize that the rule-consequentialist ap
proach purchases this immunity from abstract critique for a price: the rule
consequentialist approach is hostage to the facts as they actually tum out to
be, in whatever empirical domain is at issue. Because the relevant facts vary
over time and across domains of morality and law, it is extremely implausi
ble

(although

not logically

impossible) that the

rule-consequentialist

calculus will counsel a flat prohibition on coercive interrogation always and
everywhere. At some times, the harms that coercive interrogation might pre
vent will be greater and more likely to occur than at other times, and the
rule-consequentialist must take this into account. So too, in some polities,
under some circumstances, coercive interrogation may be justified on this
approach even if it cannot be justified in other polities under other circum
stances. The faithful rule-consequentialist cannot subscribe to any timeless
and universal prohibition on coercive interrogation.
A related point is that from the rule-consequentialist standpoint a flat
prohibition on coercive interrogation is a kind of extreme or comer solution,
and as such suspect. For any such rule, there will generally be a more per
missive substitute,

such as a rule-with-exceptions that permits some

coercive interrogation under circumstances that can be clearly defined ex
ante. Consider a rule-with-exceptions that bans coercive interrogation unless
officials

know

with

moral

certainty

that

one

thousand

people

will
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imminently die. More generally, the rule-consequentialist is obliged to con
sider a range of intermediate regimes short of a flat prohibition on coercive
interrogation. The corner solution is salient but not superior, unless that sali
ence itself produces some consequentialist benefit.
The final point is one we will emphasize in Parts II and III. The second
order arguments that support a prohibition on coercive interrogation are, in
many cases, pitched at a level of generality that would also condemn other
standard practices in which officials are legally licensed to inflict serious
harms, such as extrajudicial killing. The rule-consequentialist who sub
scribes to a prohibition on coercive interrogation bears the burden of
confronting those practices, either by extending the prohibition to include
them, or by offering some empirical consideration that makes coercive inter
rogation special. We subsequently argue that no such consideration can be
shown to exist. Whatever the merits of our answer, however, the rule
consequentialist cannot avoid the question.
To summarize the ground covered so far: we will bracket and ignore
genuinely absolutist deontological arguments that coercive interrogation is
impermissible per se. This position is very rarely defended, in light of cases
suggesting that coercive interrogation is at least sometimes necessary to
prevent third-party harms. Far more common are positions that incorporate
consequences in some way. Of these, the two most prominent are (1) a
modified deontological position that incorporates an exception or override
to a baseline deontological prohibition, where coercive interrogation can
25
prevent "catastrophic" harms; and (2) a rule-consequentialist prohibition.
Both positions turn crucially upon empirical and institutional premises or
assumptions, especially a set of predictions about the second-order effects of
the possible legal regimes. We now turn to those second-order questions.
II. SECOND-ORDER CONSIDERATIONS: THE EMPIRICAL
AND I NSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

In this Part, we assume that the consequentialists and the nonabsolutist
deontologists are right-that, at least in limited circumstances, coercive in
terrogation is morally justified. This assumption, however, provides only a
starting point for making policy choices. The further question is whether
coercive interrogation can be justified in light of what we call second-order
considerations about the legal system, and about the institutional context in
which coercive interrogation would take place. Some critics of coercive in25. We also bracket the possible view that coercive interrogation is not merely morally per
missible but indeed morally required, where lives are in the balance. Where coercive interrogation
might save third-party lives, to fail to interrogate might be seen as itself a morally objectionable
choice, a sort of moral squeamishness not justified by any plausible version of the distinction be
tween acts and omissions. (Thanks to Cass Sunstein for this point). See also Elshtain, supra note 4,
at 87 ("Far greater moral guilt falls on a person in authority who permits the deaths of hundreds of
innocents rather than choosing to 'torture' one guilty or complicit person."); Winfried Brugger, May
Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 66 1 , 669-71
(2000) (arguing that under the German constitution, which requires government to aid individuals,
torture may be constitutionally obligated).
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terrogation--even those who acknowledge first-order moral arguments for
permitting coercive interrogation in catastrophic scenarios-argue that the
second-order considerations are decisive with respect to real legal systems:
they argue, in essence, that even if a perfect government that made no errors
should have the power to engage in coercive interrogation in extreme cases,
no real world government should have such a power. In the real world, gov
ernment officials make mistakes, and actions that may be justified on a
narrowly instrumental calculus have unforeseeable institutional or systemic
effects that render them unjustified in general.
26
We address three groups of second-order considerations, and argue that
they are exceptionally weak. Second-order considerations do not justify a
flat ban on coercive interrogation.
A. Rules and Standards
The first argument is that catastrophic scenarios are too rare to justify
authorizing police to engage in coercive interrogation. Suppose that you
think that coercive interrogation can be justified only to save more than one
thousand lives, and even then that coercive interrogation would be justified
only if it was reasonably certain that the subject would provide the relevant
information that could be used to save the lives. Outside of war, such scenar
ios are extremely rare; indeed, we can think of only one, in the United States
or any other western country, in recent history: the September 11 attack
and even here it seems unlikely that the authorities would have been able to
stop the attack if they had had the power to engage in coercive interroga
27
tion. Thus, the benefits of allowing coercive interrogation would be
vanishingly small.
At the same time, the costs could be high. If officials are allowed to
engage in coercive interrogation, then no doubt they would make errors
and sometimes employ this measure against people who have no informa
tion about a pending terrorist attack or have information only about small
scale attacks whose seriousness does not justify the use of coercive inter
rogation. Unnecessary infliction of pain is an intrinsic cost, whether the
suspects are innocent or guilty of some crime. If the benefits of permitting
coercive interrogation are low in an ex ante sense, and the costs are high
because of unavoidable error, then a flat ban on coercive interrogation
28
would be justified.
This argument is a familiar point about rules and standards. Rules are
simple and easy to administer but are overinclusive and underinclusive, and
thus produce r.esults that deviate from the normative optimum that the rules
26. They have been recently summarized by Oren Gross, though he sees six; several, though,
are versions of others. Gross, supra note 4, at 1 50 1 - 1 1 .
27. See NAT'L COMM'N O N TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/1 1 COMMISSION
REPORT 254-77, 339-57 (2004), available athttp://www.9-l l commission.gov/report/9 1 !Report.pdf
(indicating that the problem was not that the authorities could not extract information from suspects,
but that they were unprepared for the type of terrorist activity that would occur on 9/1 1 ).
28.

See, e.g., Parry & White, supra note 3, at 761-62.
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are supposed to approximate. Standards directly incorporate the normative
ideal, or approximate it more closely than rules do, but, because they are
harder to understand, are more likely to result in error by decisionmakers.
Rules are likely to be better than standards when decision costs are high
relative to error costs.
The rule-consequentialist argument against coercive interrogation
amounts to the claim that a bright-line rule-a blanket prohibition on coer
cive interrogation-is superior to a standard that permits coercive
interrogation in "extreme circumstances" or the like; or, for that matter, a
slightly vaguer rule such as one that permitted coercive interrogation "only
when it is reasonably certain to save more than one thousand lives." The
reason is that high decision costs under a standard or a vaguer rule would
produce high costs-instances of unnecessary coercive interrogation
without producing large enough benefits to justify these costs, given the
rarity of extreme circumstances. This argument is conceptually coherent,
and superficially attractive; but we believe it to be flawed in point of fact.
Let us begin with the simplest question, whether coercive interrogation
works (where by "works" we mean "produces information that saves lives,
in a nontrivial range of cases"). If coercive interrogation does not work, if it
is all cost and no benefit, then there are no tradeoffs to be made, and both
29
the moral and institutional questions are easy. This is a tempting view, but
it runs aground on the evidence.
We will focu s on the Israeli evidence. Much of that evidence is anecdo
tal or impressionistic, but it strongly suggests that coercive interrogation
saves lives. The Landau Commission found that:
[E]ffective activity by the [General Security Service, or GSS] to thwart ter
rorist acts is impossible without use of the tool of the interrogation of
suspects, in order to extract from them vital information known only to
them, and unobtainable by other methods.
The effective interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible without the
use of means of pressure, in order to overcome an obdurate will not to dis
close

information

and

to

overcome the fear

of the person under

interrogation that harm will befall him from his own organization, if he
30
does reveal i nformation.

In a report submitted to the United Nations, Israel represented that GSS
investigations had foiled ninety planned terrorist attacks, including suicide

29. One can eliminate the need to address difficult moral and legal questions by insisting that
coercive interrogation is ineffective either because it produces no information or because it radical
izes one's enemy. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING
WITHOUT WAR 1 09- 1 2 (2003). We are skeptical about this approach for reasons given by Levinson.
See Levinson, supra note I, at 2028-3 1 .
30. !SR. Gov'T PRESS OFFICE, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF INVESTIGA
TION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY 78 ( 1 987),
reprinted in 23 lsR. L. REV. 1 46, 1 84 ( 1 989) [hereinafter LANDAU REPORT].
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31
bombings, car bombings, kidnappings, and murders. Although the Israeli
Supreme Court later held that GSS practices of coercive interrogation vio
lated rights of human dignity, and thus required clear legislative
authorization, the Court acknowledged that coercive interrogation works.
Here is one example the Court gave:
A powerful explosive device . . . was found in the applicant's village . . .
subsequent to the dismantling and interrogation of the terrorist cell to
which he belonged. Uncovering this explosive device thwarted an attack
. . . . According to GSS investigators, the applicant possessed additional
crucial information which he only revealed as a result of their interroga
tion. Revealing this information immediately was essential to safeguarding
32
state and regional security and preventing danger to human life.

Many people are reluctant to believe that coercive interrogation works,
not only because they convince themselves that morally bad practices must
also be ineffective, but also because they have in the back of their minds a
picture of rogue police beating suspects in a haphazard or indiscriminate
effort to gain information. As the Israeli experience shows, however, coer
cive interrogation can be done well or poorly. GSS interrogators work, or
worked, under elaborate guidelines concerning the amount and types of co
ercion that can be used, and under the constant supervision of superiors who
must provide administrative approval for the application of particular meth
33
ods. Professionalism and training can increase the benefits of coercive
interrogation, by increasing the chances of obtaining useful information, and
decreasing the harms to those interrogated.
If coercive interrogation is effective, then the cost of a bright-line rule
that bans it in all circumstances is high. This cost consists of the lives lost
because information was not obtained before the bomb explodes. Against
this cost, we must compare the benefit of the ban: the avoided cases where
government agents unj ustifiably engage in coercive interrogation. Here, we
can revert to the philosophical literature and the Israeli experience, both of
which suggest that the benefits can be greater than the costs, at least in cer
tain circumstances. The only issue is whether the error costs are so extreme
that only a bright-line ban can be justified.
There are two main reasons for thinking that the answer to this ques
tion is no. First, the question, as posed, assumes an implausibly simple
policy choice: either a flat ban or a vague standard that will be easily
abused. But there are many alternatives that fall between these extremes.
Coercive interrogation could be limited to cases where a certain number of

3 1 . U.N. COMM. AGAINST TORTURE, CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES
PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 1 9 OF THE CONVENTION, SECOND PERIODIC REPORTS OF STATES PARTIES
DUE IN 1 996, ADD., ISR., para. 24, at 7 U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/Add.2/Rev. l (Feb. 1 7, 1 997) [hereinaf
ter U.N. REPORT].
32. HCJ 5 1 00/94 Public C ommittee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel [ 1 999]
IsrSC 46(2) 1 50, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1 47 1 , 1474 (1999) (S. Ct. lsr.) [hereinafter Public Commit
tee Against Tonure in Israel].
33.

U.N. REPORT, supra note 3 1 , at 3-4.
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lives are at stake-say, one thousand. It could be limited to cases where
the subjects are known to be members of Al Qaeda or another group that
has proved its hostility and lethalness. It could be subject to special ex
ante controls, its use could be limited to specially trained and monitored
groups within the government, the type of coercive interrogation could be
circumscribed so that only "moderate" measures are used, and so forth.
34
We will discuss these design options in more detail below; for now, it is
sufficient to point out that the policy choices are more nuanced than sup
porters of the complete ban allow.
Second, ordinary and rarely criticized law enforcement practices al
ready assume that the cost of unjustified coercive interrogation is not
extremely high. Existing policy-which permits police interrogations but
bans coercive interrogation-already accepts the possibility that police
will err and use unjustified coercion. The distinction between coercive and
noncoercive interrogations is fuzzy and subject to much debate and litiga
tion. Even a decisionmaker acting in good faith can cross the line, and
engage in coercion. If we cared so much about preventing torture that we
were unwilling to tolerate even a single instance of it, then we ought to
restrict even noncoercive interrogations. A prophylactic ban on all interro
gations, for example, would eliminate coercive interrogation.
But no government is willing to go so far; presumably, the reason is
that the benefits of noncoercive interrogation are high enough to justify a
fuzzy rule or standard, even one that results in occasional erroneous deci
sions to coercively interrogate, and that the costs of coercive interrogation
are, though high, not as high as people might initially claim. B ut then it
follows that unless coercive interrogation is known to be ineffective-an
implausible assumption, as we have argued-it may be appropriate to
permit it with a fuzzy rule or standard that limits it to cases where the
benefits exceed the costs.
The comparison with police shootings is again instructive. The costs of
police shootings are extremely high-people are wounded or killed, unnec
essarily when the police make errors, as they unavoidably do-but the
benefits are also high: innocent lives are saved. Rather than banning police
shootings because of the high costs of error, governments regulate them.
And rather than using very clear rules, the regulations are replete with stan
dards-references to "justified" force, or force that the officer "reasonably
35
believes to be necessary," are common. Why shouldn't the government use
the same system of regulation for interrogations?

34.

See infra Part III .

35. While state statutes list some specific circumstances when deadly force is allowed, such
as acting as the executioner at the orders of a competent court, they also create more general stan
dards for when force is "justified."" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1 3A-3-27 ( 1994) ("A peace officer is
justified in using deadly physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he believes
it necessary . . . [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use
or imminent use of deadly force."); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7-5 (2002) ("A peace officer . . . is justi
fied in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of
any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily
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To be sure, it may be that the cost-benefit calculus is different for coer
cive interrogation and for extraj udicial killings. Perhaps extracting
information is not as important as preventing immediate violence; extrajudi
cial killing will often save another life with high probability, while
extracting information is a more speculative enterprise and will less fre
quently save lives. On the other hand, when coercive interrogation does save
lives, it may often save more lives than would extrajudicial killing. The cost
benefit calculus must consider not only the probability of averting harm, but
the magnitude of the harms averted. Overall, then, it is hardly obvious that
the net cost-benefit calculus is different in the two cases; and even if there is
a difference, it is unlikely that the difference is great enough to justify a
complete ban on coercive interrogation alone. We will return to the possibil
ity of an empirical distinction between police killings and coercive
interrogation below, in IIl.D.
What we have said so far applies, with the same force, to the many sub
tle variations on the rule/standard argument that can be found in the
literature. For example, it has been suggested that if officials must balance
the costs and benefits of coercive interrogation on a case by case basis, they
36
will inevitably underestimate the costs and overestimate the benefits. It is
not clear why this would be true though it is possible: maybe officials un
derestimate the costs because they don't sympathize with the subject, or
because the officials themselves become dehumanized by their involvement
in coercive interrogation and lose the ability to perceive the impact of their
actions on the subject; or maybe they overestimate the benefits because they
have personal or institutional reasons for exaggerating the likelihood of
threats. But, putting aside the fact that all of these worries are speculation
unencumbered by serious empirical support, they apply with equal force to
noncoercive interrogation; they are simply an aspect of police or intelligence
work. If they are valid concerns, then they provide a general case for re
stricting the police or intelligence services, subjecting them to public
oversight, and so forth; but they do not apply specially to coercive interroga
tion, j ustifying a flat ban where other areas seem appropriately governed by
standards or soft rules.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that the critics of coercive
interrogation have not yet provided a justification for an absolute ban. Most
police and intelligence work is governed by standards or soft rules; unless
there is something special about coercive interrogation, the same approach
should be used for that measure.

harm while making the arrest."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 (2003) ("A peace officer . . . is justi
fied in using deadly force when . . . the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person."). State statutes
are not the last word, of course. In Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I ( 1 985), the Court found uncon
stitutional a statute that authorized deadly force against a fleeing suspect who was neither armed nor
dangerous. Most state statutes, however, already comply with Gamer's rules.
36.

Gross, supra note 4, at 1 507.
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B. Slippery Slopes
The slippery slope argument holds that even if coercive interrogation
survives a narrow assessment of its advantages and disadvantages---o ne that
compared the immediate benefits from obtaining information and the harms
to the subject of the interrogation-it is nonetheless unjustified because of
its more remote effects. Once we allow coercive interrogation, the argument
goes, we won't be able to stop: torture will be used to punish convicted
criminals, to extract information from suspects and even witnesses in rou
37
tine criminal cases, and to intimidate political opponents.
Slippery slope arguments identify a possible unintended negative conse
quence of a particular policy; if this consequence is likely enough, then it
ought to count as a cost in the cost-benefit calculus used to evaluate the
38
rule. But the fact that bad consequences are possible is not itself a suffi
cient reason for banning an activity. Proponents of a slippery slope argument
bear the burden of showing that the unintended consequence is likely
enough that it should be included in the calculus; this involves (1) identify
ing a mechanism by which the initial policy choice might lead to the adverse
consequence, and (2) providing some evidence that this mechanism operates
39
in fact. Proponents of a flat ban on coercive interrogation have not met this
burden.
The first argument is that once the taboo against coercive interrogation is
shattered, the psychological constraints against inflicting pain will fall away,
brutalizing the law enforcement officials who use coercive interrogation.
Police who justifiably use coercive interrogation in one setting-the preven
tion of catastrophic terrorist attacks-will start using it to extract
information or even confessions from petty criminals and even innocent
bystanders who are thought to be withholding information about a crime
40
that they have witnessed. Alternatively, even if the shattering of the taboo
does not itself increase police brutality, sadists may self-select into police
work at greater rates than they otherwise would.

37. Id. at 1 508-09; Seth Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Con
straints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 278 (2003); Mordechai
Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report-Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law or
the Law to the "Needs " of the Security Service?, 23 lsR. L. REv. 2 1 6, 254-57, 261-62 ( 1 989); Parry
& White, supra note 3, at 763.
38.
39.
(2003).
40.

See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 ( 1 985).
See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 1 1 6 HARV. L. REV. 1026
Kremnitzer, supra note 37, at 261-62.
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41
These arguments are not supported by evidence. One could make the
same argument about police shootings: if the government allows police to
shoot people, then police will be morally corrupted and treat suspects with
unnecessary brutality, or would-be Rambos will self-select into police work
in large numbers. But this does not appear to have occurred, or, if it has, this
adverse consequence of permitting the police to use deadly force is univer
sally seen as justified by the need to protect crime victims. And if people
who routinely inflict pain on others lose their capacity to sympathize with
42
their subjects, there are a variety of institutional mechanisms that can be
used to confine coercive interrogation to the appropriate setting, just as
training, contractual incentives and criminal penalties, citizen oversight, and
other institutional arrangements are used to prevent police shootings from
slipping out of control.
A second and related argument is that society as a whole is brutalized if
police engage in coercive interrogation. The shattering of the taboo against
coercive interrogation would result in the public and the government acquir
ing a new enthusiasm not just for this measure, which could result in its
routine use as an instrument of law enforcement, but also for torture, as a
device for punishing criminals, intimidating political opponents, and dem
onstrating the power of the state.
The problem with this argument is the same as the problem with the
first: it is pure speculation, belied by our experiences with other measures.
Take capital punishment. One could argue that killing convicted criminals is
just as likely to brutalize society as torturing them. Yet the trend has been in
the opposite direction. Historically, nations have cut back on capital pun
ishment rather than expanding it; this has been driven by revulsion against
its use against minor criminals or political opponents. In the United States
today, there appears to be little pressure to expand the death penalty-to,
say, ordinary murders or robbery or rape.
The argument recalls the various "ratchet" theories, which hold that the
adoption of new law enforcement measures that restrict civil liberties inevi
tably become entrenched, and thus the starting point when new emergencies
generate pressure for aggressive law enforcement, so that there is always a
downward pressure on civil liberties. These theories have never been ade43
quately defended. In the context of torture, there have been many examples
4 1 . One scholar argues that the CIA contributed to the destabilization of the Philippines
and the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by training officers in the techniques of psychological
torture. See Alfred W. McCoy, Cruel Science: CIA Torture and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1 9 NEW ENG.
J. Pus. PoL' Y 209, 228-3 1 (2005). But his evidence is exceedingly weak, and consistent with the
opposite conclusion: that the Philippines would be less stable, and the Shah's government would
have collapsed earlier, had they not used torture. As McCoy concedes that these countries would
have used torture even without the CIA's help, and as he argues only that the CIA's contribution
consisted of training foreign police in the techniques of psychological torture, his evidence does
not support the claim that the use of torture by the CIA "metastasized," resulting in unintended
injury to friendly governments.
42.
43.
(2003).

We discuss these mechanisms below in Part III .
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605
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of western countries adopting coercive interrogation and similar aggressive
practices as temporary measures to deal with a particular emergency
France in Algeria, Britain against the IRA-and then abandoning them
44
when the emergency is over. Israel uses coercive interrogation against sus
pected terrorists; this practice has not spread to other settings, as far as we
4
know. 5 Far from desensitizing the public to violence and pain, the use of
coercive· interrogation and similar measures can inspire revulsion, and a re
46
newal of a commitment not to use them except in extreme circumstances.
Capital punishment, coercive interrogation, the use of deadly force
against dangerous suspects, and similar law enforcement devices are used,
or not used, as circumstances warrant. It is possible that they have unpre
dictable second-order effects on public psychology, but we do not know the
direction of these effects, and the historical record does not support the
claim that harsh police tactics cannot be controlled but must inevitably be
come harsher. Here again, we emphasize that everything depends on what
the facts turn out to be. Because arguments about policies such as coercive
interrogation and capital punishment are hostage to what the facts show, in
particular domains, there is no slope at all, j ust a series of discrete policy
problems all arrayed on a level. Support for coercive interrogation need not
commit policymakers to support for punitive torture or slavery or any other
horror.
A third concern is that once coercive interrogation is authorized, offi
cials will, over time, become more and more expert in using it effectively.
As this happens, one of the main objections to coercive interrogation-that
it is ineffective, or is often used when it is ineffective-will disappear, and
thus coercive interrogation, according to the cost-benefit calculus, will be
used more often. Although this theory may be right, it implies only that co
ercive interrogation will become more common, not that it will be used in an
47
unjustified fashion or produce some other adverse consequence.
C. Symbolism
Several arguments in the literature can be placed under the heading of
symbolism. These arguments often are hard to distinguish from slippery
44.
See BENJAMIN STORA, ALGERJA: 1 830-2000 : A SHORT HISTORY 49-5 1 (Jane Marie
Todd trans., 200 1 ) (describing the use of torture by French forces to defeat an insurrection in Al
giers); Kreimer, supra note 37, at 280 n. 10 (discussing the B ritish use of coercive interrogation in
Northern Ireland in the 1 970s).

45. For example, it has not spread from interrogation to confession. LANDAU REPORT, supra
note 30, at 1 52 ("[T]he GSS is very scrupulous about not accepting from persons under interroga
tion false confessions concerning untrue facts.").
46. See STORA, supra note 44, at 87-93 (describing the reactions of the French public to the
use of torture in Algeria).
47. Similarly for the idea that the permissibility of coercive interrogation will dampen police
incentives to engage in research and development of new technologies for discovering information.
If coercive interrogation works well, there is little reason for law to expend large resources stimulat
ing such research and development. Any technique that works also dampens the search for substitute
techniques, but that is no objection from a normative point of view.
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slope arguments but we consider them separately because their force does
not depend on slippery slope concerns being valid.
First, one might argue that coercive interrogation is in tension with the
"symbolism of human dignity and the inviolability of the human body," in
48
the words of Oren Gross. We just don't understand this argument. Im
prisoning criminals and using violence and deadly force against them
when they threaten others also are inconsistent with human dignity.and the
inviolability of the human body, but they are nonetheless tolerated because
of their benefits. Gross also argues that a flat ban on coercive interrogation
49
gives "notice that fundamental rights and values are not forsaken." B ut
this giving of notice is, or ought to be, parasitic on the underlying substan
tive decision. If we allow coercive interrogation, we don ' t want to give
notice that we are not allowing coercive interrogation, or endorse values
that are inconsistent with it.
Second, the ban on coercive interrogation might have an "educational
50
function." It teaches both Americans and foreigners about human dignity
and the value of human rights. But if coercive interrogation-like impris
onment, or police shootings-is justified, and thus consistent with our
values, then we shouldn't want to teach people that coercive interrogation is
wrong; quite the contrary. If coercive interrogation is justified, a ban on co
ercive interrogation might teach people to overvalue the avoidance of pain
and undervalue human life.
Third, Jeremy Waldron argues that the ban on coercive interrogation is a
"legal archetype" that expresses "the spirit of a whole structured area of
doctrine, and does so vividly, effectively, and publicly, establishing the sig
51
nificance of that area for the entire legal enterprise." The policy expressed
by the ban is that "[l]aw is not brutal in its operation. Law is not savage.
52
Law does not rule through abject fear and terror . . . ." Other legal arche
types, according to Waldron, are the writ of habeas corpus, the holding in
Brown v. Board of Education, the rule of adverse possession, and the doc
53
trine of consideration. As the last two examples make clear, Waldron holds
that a legal archetype is a sort of heuristic device that "expresses or epito
54
mizes the spirit of a whole structured area of doctrine" and thereby helps
people organize a body of doctrine around its dominant principles.
Heuristics may have instrumental value, but Waldron exaggerates their
significance if he is claiming that the elimination of a heuristic will
48.

Gross, supra note 4, at 1 504.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. ; see also Parry & White, supra note 3, at 763.

5 1 . Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 1 05
CoLUM. L. REV. 1 68 1 , 1 723 (2005). Waldron actually casts his argument as a condemnation of
"torture," but he focuses almost exclusively on what we call coercive interrogation, and we address
his argument only to that extent.
52.

Id. at 1 726 (emphasis added).

53.

Id. at 1723-26.

54.

Id. at 1 723.
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undermine, or even result in serious confusion about, an area of law or
policy. Just as we could eliminate the doctrine of consideration without
55
losing "contract law's commitment to market-based notions of fairness,"
we could eliminate a ban against coercive interrogation without losing the
criminal justice system's commitment to minimizing brutality. Here
Waldron makes a typical philosopher's mistake by attempting to derive
concrete conclusions from premises that are too general or abstract to cut
between policy choices on the ground. The commitment to minimize law's
brutality is on both sides of this argument. Where coercive interrogation can
save lives, not engaging in it might seem the more brutal choice, especially
to those whose lives are at stake. Those people might reasonably hold that
there is a sort of brutal callousness, a self-absorbed moral preciosity, in the
decision to preserve the law's archetypal integrity by permitting third-party
56
deaths to go unprevented.
Like many second-order arguments, Waldron's account trivializes the
policies that he is trying to invest with significance. Consider how his argu
ment might apply to the debate about capital punishment. The reason that
critics oppose capital punishment is not that it expresses brutality; the rea
son is that it kills people. Similarly, the only strong argument against torture
is that it causes pain. When we object to brutal laws, we object because they
are brutal, not because they "express brutality." If we nonetheless tolerate
them because they produce some good, their symbolic meaning falls by the
wayside, in part because that meaning is qualified: a brutal law that does
good no longer expresses brutality in unambiguous form. Indeed, such laws
do no more than symbolize the government's willingness to produce the
greatest possible good overall. On this view, a system of regulated coercive
interrogation would have the same symbolic effect as the use of deadly force
by police and the laws of war that permit the killing of civilians in the
course of destroying a legitimate military target.
There seems to be a strong feeling that if the United States abandons its
ban on coercive interrogation, the rest of the world will not only imitate U.S.
policy-which, of course, is not objectionable if U.S. policy is correct, as
we are assuming for the sake of argument. The rest of the world will do
worse; seeing that the United States endorses the infliction of pain for the
purpose of interrogation, other countries will use it for punishment, show
57
trials, and so forth.
This argument rests on the assumption of U.S. exceptionalism, the no
tion that, in Ronald Reagan's words, the United States is a "shining city on a
58
hill" that the rest of the world looks up to and emulates. Once the United

55. Id. at 1 726. The consideration doctrine does not exist in Civil Code countries, which
committed to market principles.
56.

See Moore, supra note 4, at 329; Elshtain, supra note 4, at 86-87.

57.

Levinson, supra note I, at 2052-53; Parry & White, supra note 3, at 763.

are

58. Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan II, 1989), in 2 Pueuc PAPERS OF
RONALD REAGAN 1 988-89, at 1 7 1 8, 1 7 22 (quoting John Winthrop) (Off. of the Fed. Reg. ed., 1 9909 1).
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States is shown to be a "normal" state, its ideals will cease to inspire others.
There are many reasons for doubting this account. First, the United States is
not as exceptional as it once was: there are many liberal democracies today;
the United States is just one. Second, the United States increasingly has a
reputation as a conservative, religious, punitive, and even militaristic coun
try; its use of coercive interrogation in limited circumstances would have no
more than a marginal effect when the United States is already heavily criti
cized for policies that are not going to change anytime soon-capital
punishment, ungenerous social welfare policies, aggressive use of its mili
tary, disinclination to cooperate in international organizations, and so forth.
Coercive interrogation is just one more item on this list, unlikely by itself to
change the reputation of the United States. Third, the United States' reputa
tion rests not only on its commitment to liberal principles, but on its lack of
dogmatism about them, and especially the pragmatic way that it has relaxed
them when necessary to counter internal or external threats. Liberal coun
tries that collapse into chaos, that cannot protect their citizens, or that are
bullied by authoritarian countries or terrorist organizations, are not attractive
role models.
Another argument that is sometimes made is that a ban on coercive in
terrogation "facilitates the government's claim to the moral high ground in
59
the battle against terrorists." This argument recalls the old cold war argu
ments that the United States should take the moral high ground in
international relations in order to win the propaganda war against the Soviet
60
These arguments had force then, and ought to have force now. Even

Union.

if coercive interrogation is justified in some settings, its use will almost cer
tainly be a public relations setback-just as the Abu Ghraib scandal was
and fodder for those who want to portray the United States as corrupt and
immoral. Part of the problem for the United States is to persuade the unde
cided living in Muslim countries that they should throw in their lot with the
West and not with Islamic radicalism. If the law enforcement methods of the
United States are no more attractive than the law enforcement methods es
poused by Islamic radicals, then a valuable propaganda tool is lost.
But there are countervailing considerations. The West must project an
image of strength as well as virtue; undecided Muslims and Arabs will not
cast their lot with governments that cannot protect themselves and their
people, as we noted before. But whatever the force of these arguments, they
only identify one cost that must be balanced against the benefits of coercive
interrogation. The public relations effect of coercive interrogation is just one
factor among many. It may justify restricting coercive interrogation more
than the narrow instrumental calculus suggests; but it is hard to see how it
could justify a flat prohibition.

59.

Gross, supra note 4, at 1 505.

60. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000).
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III. LEGAL REGULATION OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION
A Outlaw and Forgive
In Part 11, we criticized the argument that there should be a total legal
ban on coercive interrogation. But, as we noted, many critics of coercive
interrogation believe that there should be a kind of political escape valve, so
that coercive interrogation will occur, despite the legal ban, if there is a
catastrophic scenario. The standard view seems to be that we should simply
maintain the status quo: coercive interrogation remains illegal and officials
who nonetheless employ it may seek public vindication, including a par
61
don. This "outlaw and forgive" ("OAF') approach, as we shall call it,
comes in two flavors. The first places the responsibility to forgive with po
litical officials such as prosecutors, governors, or presidents. The second
places the responsibility with judges or juries.
1. Popular Justice
The first version of OAF holds that courts should convict government
agents who engage in coercive interrogation, but if the coercive interroga
tion was morally justified, then the defendant should be pardoned, or
perhaps not tried in the first place via the exercise of prosecutorial discre
tion. One might even imagine the public taking matters in its own hands and
62
hiding or protecting the defendant, or electing him or her to office, or re
63
electing the defendant if he or she is already an elected official.
The peculiar feature of this argument is the assumption that public offi
cials will act correctly if they are told that correct action is against the law.
Why wouldn't they just say to themselves, as they must every day: "I could
get the truth out of this suspect by banging him up but for whatever reason
I'm not allowed to do this, so I won't"? The implicit assumption is that the
64
public official will act correctly when enough lives are at stake, but why
should we assume that a police officer would be willing to risk his career
and his freedom to save the lives of others? Of course, there are many he
roes who would do this, but we don't normally, when designing legal
6 1 . Gross, supra note 4, at 1 520; Levinson, supra note 1 , at 2048; Shue, supra note 4, at 1 27.
A related view can be found in Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture
of Suspected Terrorists, 8 E uR J. INT'L L. 596 ( 1 997).
.

62. Cf , ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
( 1 975) (describing protection of fugitive slaves in the North).
63. Lincoln's reelection can be interpreted as vindication of his various extraconstitutional
acts. This idea of emergency prerogative can be traced back to Locke. See ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 60--64 ( 1 973). Our focus, however, is not on the
president (for whom the OAF approach may have a stronger basis) but on ordinary government
agents.
64.
See Gross, supra note 4, at 1 529-34. Gross argues that the danger that the public will not
ratify the official's illegal but justified use of coercive interrogation is a good thing, as it will ensure
that the official will not act except in an emergency. He doesn't acknowledge that the same danger
may ensure that the official will not act even in an emergency. Given his premise that the use of
coercive interrogation in an emergency can be j ustified, we don't find his argument persuasive.
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restrictions on the activities of government agents, base the law on the as
sumption that agents will act heroically.
Let us try to think about this problem from the perspective of a police
officer who has custody of a member of Al Qaeda, a person who, the officer
suspects, knows about plans for a major terrorist attack. Under OAF, the
officer should anticipate that if he uses coercive interrogation, he will be
convicted of a crime, but there is a chance that the public will forgive him,
and that he will be pardoned or not charged in the first place or acquitted by
a jury. But how will he know if the public will forgive him? The public
might be grateful, but it might also be outraged. The public might make the
correct moral calculus or it might make the wrong moral calculus.
In general, there is no reason to think that OAF will produce optimal de
terrence. Ex post politics will sometimes forgive interrogation when it
shouldn't be forgiven, and sometimes punish interrogation when it shouldn't
be punished. If an OAF regime does happen to produce optimal deterrence,
it will be but a lucky coincidence, for there is no general mechanism that
acts to align the incentives produced by OAF with optimal incentives.
Moreover, even if the happy coincidence does occur, the optimal OAF re
gime is unlikely to prove stable for very long, as we discuss below.
The argument against OAF is identical to the argument in favor of the
rule of law, an argument that appears to be decisive in every other setting,
including the regulation of ordinary police practices such as the use of
deadly force. Although prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, and the
pardon power are important features of contemporary law enforcement,
these phenomena are generally accepted as either unavoidable (in the case
of prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification) or as safety valves for cor
recting injustices that occur in anomalous cases, not as the chief tool for
ensuring that people are given the right incentives against a background
where desirable behavior is, for whatever reason, illegal. We need not rehash
all the rule of law arguments against such a system. It is sufficient to recall
that there are good reasons of fairness and incentives to tell government
agents in advance what they should do, and what they shouldn't do. Regu
lating ex post through public opinion, even if mediated by political officials
such as prosecutors or elected leaders, makes officers dependent on their
abilities to prognosticate the public mood, which can sometimes seize on
factors that are irrelevant to the decision in question. Excessive caution is
the most likely result.
65
OAF regimes can be found in other areas of criminal law. Laws that
prohibit sodomy, fornication, adultery, and euthanasia are frequently cited
examples of laws that are on the books but that are not enforced or (in the
case of euthanasia) tacitly are permitted under special circumstances. But
none of these examples provides support for an OAF regime for coercive
interrogation.

65. They have a family resemblance to the notion of acoustic separation. See Meir Dan
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625 ( 1 984).

696

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:67 1

Most of these OAF regimes-for example, sodomy and adultery
laws-arose inadvertently, not as a result of deliberate policy. The regime
is an unintended or accidental byproduct of changes in norms or behavior,
changes that temporarily outrun changes in law; and the OAF regime is
precarious and often collapses in relatively short order, as the contradic
tion between official rule and actual practice becomes ever more widely
understood. Indeed, "forgiveness" in these cases is automatic; people are
almost never convicted for these crimes, and no one would defend laws
against sodomy on the ground that they cause people to engage in sodomy
only in the conditions when it is morally justified and not otherwise ! Ex
perience with these laws suggests an OAF regime for coercive interrogation
would likely be infeasible, because unstable in the medium and long term,
as it became widely understood that officials were awarding ex post li
censes to interrogators.
The best example of an OAF regime that may seem functional is that of
euthanasia. Many people acknowledge that mercy killing may be morally
justified in narrow conditions, but prefer to maintain an absolute ban on
euthanasia, with the tacit understanding that doctors may be spared prosecu
tion and punishment if circumstances are pressing enough. But, as a result,
the practice of euthanasia is shrouded in secrecy. We know very little about
euthanasia in the United States; perhaps doctors practice euthanasia at the
right times, but perhaps they do not. When abortion OAF regimes existed
prior to Roe v. Wade, wealthier women could sometimes rely on their doc
tors, while poorer women resorted to back alley abortions. Perhaps, today
doctors provide euthanasia to those who can afford high-quality health care,
and others provide back alley euthanasia to those who cannot.
Recent accounts from the Netherlands paint an unattractive picture of
OAF. There, consensual euthanasia is legal, but infant euthanasia is illegal
and yet nonetheless practiced. "Behind the scenes paediatricians [sic] in the
Netherlands have been making tacit deals with local prosecutors' offices for
years, promising to report cases of 'life-ending treatment for newborns' in
return for guarantees that the doctors will not find themselves hauled into
66
the dock facing charges of murder." Secrecy and lack of public account
ability are the result. Doctors have recently demanded that the government
issue regulations; despite the tacit deals, doctors fear criminal liability and
are reluctant to continue the practice of infant euthanasia without an explicit
67
legal license. The Dutch OAF regime for euthanasia, then, does not seem
66. See Ian Traynor, Secret Killings of Newborn Babies Trap Dutch Doctors in Moral Maze,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 2 1 , 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co. uk/uk_news/story/0,, 1 3 77808,00.html.
67. Id. The predictable result of the OAF regime in the Netherlands is that doctors refuse to
divulge information about their infant euthanasia practices. See Henk Jochemsen & John Keown,
Voluntary Euthanasia Under Control?, Further Empirical Evidence from the Netherlands, 25 J.
MED. ETHICS 1 6, 1 8 ( 1 999). By contrast, they have complied with reporting requirements fur a
significant fraction of cases involving adult euthanasia, which is legal (forty-one percent in 1 995).
Id. at 1 9. Interestingly, Jochemsen and Keown, who are critics of Dutch euthanasia, argue that le
galization has resulted in a slide down the slippery slope because the Dutch now condone some
types of non-voluntary euthanasia. Id. at 2 1 . But the authors cannot trace this change in attitude to
legalization-legalization may have followed changes in attitudes-and in any event the change in
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to provide good incentives, prevents public debate and accountability, and is
unstable.
The euthanasia OAF regimes, here and elsewhere, arose spontaneously,
as a result of civil disobedience by doctors. No one proposed that these re
gimes be put in place. Accordingly, it is distinctive, and distinctly odd, to
propose that coercive interrogation should intentionally and avowedly be
regulated by means of an OAF regime. The public statement of the pro
posal-after all, proponents of an OAF regime publish their writings-gives
it a self-defeating character, undermining the proposal itself. OAF regimes
68
may often represent "states that are essentially by-products," which can
happen to come into being as the byproduct of changes in norms outpacing
changes in law, but which cannot be deliberately brought into being through
intentional and publicly avowed policy choice. The publicity of the debate is
crucial here. It is perfectly coherent for a group of legal elites secretly to
approve of the twin facts that coercive interrogation is used and that the pub
lic does not generally understand that it is used; but presumably that is not
the sort of thing the OAF proponents mean to be defending.
2. The Necessity Defense
Israeli law bans coercive interrogation, and yet Israeli security has used
this measure, apparently because officials who use coercive interrogation
may be shielded by the necessity defense (as well as prosecutorial discretion
69
that is predisposed in their favor). Under the necessity defense, which ex
ists in U.S. law as well, an act that would otherwise be a serious crime
killing, torture--does not give rise to legal liability if it was necessary to
prevent a greater harm. Now, in U.S. law the necessity defense would not
typically be available to an official who engaged in coercive interrogation
70
because the necessary act must usually prevent an imminent threat. Shoot
ing an armed suspect in order to prevent him from killing a hostage is
11
justified; using physical pressure on the suspect in order to extract the loca
tion of a hostage who is about to be killed is not justified. But in Israel, the
72
necessity defense is, in practice, given greater scope.

attitudes can be attributed to benign causes: exposed to public debate about euthanasia practices, the
Dutch view toward euthanasia, unsurprisingly, has evolved.
68.
( 1 983).
69.

See JoN ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 1 02

LANDAU REPORT, supra note 30, at 1 67.

70. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10. l (d)(5), at 1 29-3 1 (2d ed.
2003) (saying one must wait until there is absolutely no other option and "[the] hope of survival
disappears").
71.

See id. § 1 0.5, at 1 6 1 .

72. Although the Israeli Supreme Court denied that the necessity defense authorizes coercive
interrogation, it said, at the same time, that officials could use the necessity defense if they are
charged. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, supra note 32, at 1486-88. This distinction is a
rather subtle one but appears to have led to a reduction in the use of coercive interrogation by Israeli
security. Parry & White, supra note 3, at 760.
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Critics of coercive interrogation who nonetheless believe it should be
used in catastrophic scenarios sometimes see the necessity defense as a
73
good comprornise. Coercive interrogation remains illegal, but the necessity
defense can be used-either in its present form, or broadened somewhat-in
order to immunize the official who uses coercive interrogation to prevent a
catastrophe. The rationale appears to be that the law's symbolic rejection of
torture is maintained, while coercive interrogation can be used when it is
justified. A closely related view is that judges should suspend the sentence
of convicted torturers whose behavior does not meet the requirements of the
74
necessity defense but was nonetheless justified.
We are puzzled by this argument. As Levinson remarks, reliance on the
75
necessity defense would not avoid legitimizing coercive interrogation; it
would avoid legitimating coercive interrogation only when it is not "neces
sary." The necessity defense is no more likely to maintain the illegitimacy of
coercive interrogation than the doctrine of official immunity maintains the
illegitimacy of the use of deadly force by police officers. The defense of
necessity, like the defense of official immunity, renders legitimate those ac
tions that fall within its scope.
The implicit theory of the advocates of the necessity defense is that a
statute that creates liability sends the message to the public, while the statute
that provides a defense against liability remains silent. But as the public
does not usually pay attention to the law on the books-and when it does,
never discriminates between statutes that create liability and statutes that
provide defenses-but instead observes police officers either being con
victed of crimes or not being convicted of crimes, this theory is dubious. If
the public is paying no attention to legal rules, and only looks at outcomes,
it will just see interrogators going unpunished in a range of cases. If the
public does pay attention to legal rules, why will it only pay attention to the
ex ante prohibition and not the ex post license? OAF rests on arbitrary as
sumptions about the audience for law's expressions.
There is a further point, which is that if it really matters whether the
power to use coercive interrogation is located in the statute that creates li
ability, or in the defense, this can be easily handled; indeed it already is.
When a police officer kills a person and a prosecutor charges him with mur
der, the officer's defense will be official immunity. Whether or not the police
officer is convicted turns on the scope of the defense. If the killing was justi
fied under the statute or doctrine that creates official immunity, then it was
not murder. Coercive interrogation could be similarly handled, if these for
76
mal distinctions were thought to be important.

73. Parry & White, supra note 3, at 764-65. Shue also seems to suggest that the necessity
defense may be appropriate. Shue, supra note 4, at 1 43.
74. See Shue, supra note 4, at 1 43. These arguments recall Dan-Cohen's theory of acoustic
separation. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 65.
75.

Levinson, supra note I, at 2045.

76.
This approach would allow the legislature to decide the standard for using coercive inter
rogation, rather than relying on a doctrine that was never understood to have this purpose (at least,
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B. The Torture War rant
Alan Dershowitz has argued that coercive interrogation should be per
77
mitted only after officials have obtained a warrant from a judge. This
proposal has been criticized on the ground that in the catastrophic scenario
78
there will rarely be an opportunity to consult a judge; but this criticism is
overblown. The torture warrant is not meant as a panacea; when there is
time to obtain a warrant, the involvement of the judiciary serves its purpose.
When there is not time, then either the warrant requirement could be
waived-as in the case for ordinary search and arrest warrants when exigent
circumstances exist--or else coercive interrogation might be prohibited. In
the latter case, the torture warrant serves its purpose only when there are not
time constraints, but there is no reason to think that this is the null set.
We don't think, however, that the torture warrant is the end of the story.
Just as in the case of searches, a warrant requirement can be only one piece
of a much larger regulatory structure, to which we now tum.
C. A Proposal for Regulating Coercive Interrogation
In order to deter and investigate crimes, police employ a range of meas
ures, including: surveillance of public places; stops, interrogations, and pat
downs of people who are acting suspiciously; temporary detention; nonco
ercive interrogation that may, however, involve deception and mild
intimidation; the use of force, including deadly force, to protect the lives of
third parties such as hostages and crime victims; searches of people and
places; and wiretapping and the like. The measures range from the mini
mally intrusive (surveillance of public places) to the maximally intrusive
(use of deadly force), and there are corresponding thresholds that limit the
circumstances under which these measures may be employed. There is vir
tually no limit on surveillance of public places; reasonable suspicion is
required before police can stop and question a person; probable cause is
needed before a search warrant will be issued; and the threat of imminent
harm to a third party is necessary if deadly force is to be used.
What happens when police violate these rules? In some cases, nothing at
all. In other cases, courts refuse to admit evidence that is acquired in viola
tion of the rules, and a criminal may go free. In extreme cases, police
officers may be sanctioned, fired, or convicted of crimes. For example, a
police officer who kills a suspect who did not pose any immediate danger to
the public is likely to be penalized and even fired; if the circumstances are
egregious, the officer will be prosecuted for murder.

in U.S. law), and would need to be revised. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It Necessary to Apply
"Physical Pressure " to Terrorists-And to Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 1 92 ( 1 989) (discussing
problems with using the necessity defense in these circumstances); Kremnitzer, supra note 37, at
237-47.
77.

DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 4, at 158-59.

78.

Gross, supra note 4, at 1 536.
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The reasons for this regulatory scheme are straightforward. Police offi
cers are agents, and as principal-agent models show, a bundle of carrots and
9
sticks is necessary to provide them with the right incentives. 7 Ideally, police
officers will use aggressive measures only when the gains to the public
safety exceed the costs to the people who are subject to the measures
(whether they are innocents who are misidentified or criminals). However,
police officers, like ordinary people, do not necessarily have the right incen
tives to use these measures properly.
The basic problem is this. If police officers are paid a flat salary, and not
rewarded for good work, then they may not work diligently to deter crime
and capture suspects. The normal solution to this problem is to fire or de
mote lazy officers, and reward the diligent officers-usually by retaining
(and paying) them, and promoting them at intervals, and giving them better
working conditions (for example, day rather than night shifts). The problem
with this simple scheme, however, is that police officers might act too ag
gressively. If they are rewarded for arresting a lot of people, then they may
be tempted to arrest people who are not clearly guilty, or to use aggressive
measures such as searches to find the guilty. In addition, zeal for law en
forcement or sympathy for victims may result in excessively aggressive
police tactics even in the absence of the normal reward mechanisms.
And so police departments and legislatures try to steer police away from
tactics that externalize costs on innocents, or offend our sense of how the
guilty ought to be treated. This is why we have rules that prohibit police
from shooting people who are unarmed, or engaging in high-speed chases
through busy streets, or searching houses without a warrant. These rules
refine incentives so that police officers aggressively pursue criminals with
out creating excessive costs for innocents or otherwise exceeding the bounds
of civilized behavior.
80
Where does coercive interrogation fit in? Traditionally, it was off limits
in the same sense as shooting unarmed criminals is ; even if a useful police
tactic in some cases, it exceeds the bounds of civilized behavior and thus is
unacceptable. If philosophers are correct that coercive interrogation may be
j ustified in limited cases, however, and if 9/11 shows that this set of cases
may be nontrivial, then coercive interrogation ought to be added to the bas
ket of permissible tactics, albeit subject to the same sorts of safeguards.
As we have already argued, we think that the regulation of the use of
deadly force provides a model for regulating coercive interrogation. Just
how coercive interrogation should be regulated depends on several factors.
To take the extreme case, if coercive interrogation simply does not work or
rarely works, then obviously it is sensible to ban it with no exceptions. In
what follows, we sketch out a general framework that assumes that coercive
interrogation is effective; but the details of this framework will depend on

79. Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW
AND EcONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) .
80.

That is, since the Supreme Court invalidated these measures just prior to World War II.

See Parry & White, supra note 3, at 748-54.
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just how effective it is, and whether its effectiveness is limited to certain
situations.
I.

Thresholds for using coercive interrogation. It seems sensible to limit
coercive interrogation in the same way deadly force is limited. The rule
might be: "police may use coercive interrogation only when they are
reasonably certain that an individual possesses information that could
prevent an imminent crime that will kill at least n people," where n is
some number that reflects the balance of gains and losses from coercive
81
interrogation (One thousand? One hundred? One?). For the conse
quentialist, n may be a relatively low number; for the deontologist, n
might be very high, the catastrophic scenario; but otherwise, both types
of thinker should approve of our rule.

2.

Limits of coercive interrogation: methods. Just as police are not allowed
to carry bazookas, they should not be allowed to use methods of coer
cive interrogation that are excessive-that will cause too much harm
82

relative to the benefits. The literature refers to "moderate" methods.

We do not know what methods these are; perhaps a good starting point
would be the methods already used by U.S. agents agai nst high level
83
members of Al Qaeda-sleep deprivation, disorientation, and the I i ke.
In any event, a good rule would limit agents to the minimal amount of
coercion that is necessary. Interrogation might also be videotaped, for
review either by administrative superiors or judicial tribunals or both.
3.

Limits of coercive interrogation: subjects. It seems reasonable to limit
the use of coercive interrogation to members of terrorist groups known
to use violent methods against U.S. civilians. The obvious example

81.

Or a vaguer standard might be used, such as that of the Model Penal Code:

( I ) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of
Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor

is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person
whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent
persons; and
(iv) the actor believes that:
(A) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use
of deadly force; or
(B) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily
injury if his apprehension is delayed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (2001 ).
82. U.N. REPORT, supra note 3 1 , at 2 (referring to the type of pressure used to obtain infor
mation from terrorists as being moderate).
83.

See Levinson, supra note 1 , at 201 7-28, for Levinson's survey of media accounts.
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today is Al Qaeda, but Al Qaeda might disappear and be replaced with
some other group. The benefit of such a limit is that it would prevent
the use of coercive interrogation against ordinary criminals; the cost is
that the limit would prevent the use of coercive interrogation against
ordinary criminals where coercive interrogation would be justified (for
example, domestic terrorists), against members of new international
terrorist groups, and against members of Al Qaeda who are not known
to be members of Al Qaeda. It might be that these costs are too high,
and the subject limitations should be broader-to include, for example,
kidnappers with a violent history who have been captured and refuse to

disclose the location of the kidnapping victim. 84
4.

Warrants. Dershowitz's warrant idea makes sense when the harm is not
imminent, so that there is time to involve a magistrate or judge. The
magistrate or judge should issue a warrant only when coercive interro
gation will likely yield information that will prevent a crime that will
kill n people.

5.

Immunities an d punishments. Officers who employ coercive interroga
tion measures in violation of these rules should be punished in the same
way that officers who violate the rules against deadly force are pun
ished.

Typically,

officers

are

granted immunity when they act
85
and this may be appropriate

reasonably, or in "objective good faith,''

for coercive interrogation as well. Even so, administrative sanctions
may be appropriate. When officers do not act reasonably, the immunity
should be withdrawn, and the officer should be punished for violating
laws against battery, torture, and similar uses of force.

6.

Training an d expertise. Nearly all police officers are authorized to use
deadly force. A n i mportant way of preventing error is through training.
Similarly, one might argue that police officers should be trained in co
ercive

interrogation.

Alternatively,

to

the

extent

that

coercive

interrogation requires unusual skills, or may corrupt its practitioners or
lead them to use it in routine cases, and to the extent that it is not neces
sary to use it very often, it might make sense to have a special squad of
officers who are trained in coercive interrogation, and who are made
86
available when circumstances warrant. However, this can work only
when there are minimal time constraints; otherwise, it is subject to the
same objections as the warrant requirement.

7.

Review by experts an d the public. One important distinction between
deadly force and coercive interrogation is that the first occurs fre
quently, and each instance is subject to public debate. The latter occurs
much less frequently, and when it does, it is either concealed from the
public or roundly condemned. As a result, the merits and demerits of

84. See Amnesty Int'I, Germany 's Torturous Debate, http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/
April2003/Germany (describing an incident in which a kidnapper disclosed the location of the vic
tim (a child, whom he had killed) after a police officer threatened that force would be used against
him).
85.

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 8 1 8 ( 1982).

86. The Investigators Unit, the GSS unit that uses coercive interrogation, is a small minority
of the total GSS personal. See LANDAU REPORT, supra note 30, at 148.
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coercive interrogation are much more poorly understood than the merits
and demerits of deadly force. To correct this imbalance, we think that
instances of coercive interrogation should always be carefully analyzed,
by special commissions of experts or self-appoi nted public watchdogs.

This seems obvious, but we mention it because many people in the lit
erature think that the symbolism is a good reason for banning coercive
interrogation, or discouraging it; this idea seems to drive the proposal that it
should be kept illegal for symbolic purposes even though officials will
s7
sometimes be morally justified in violating the law. As we discussed
above, we don' t think this argument makes sense; a further problem with it
is that it will encourage officers to conceal their behavior. After the Israeli
Supreme Court rejected the use of coercive interrogation, the GSS officially
stopped using it. It is possible that now the GSS has found less objection
able ways to maintain security, but some reports suggest that the use of
ss
coercive interrogation has continued with greater secrecy. If so, then the
methods may be used with less political oversight and accountability. This
would be unfortunate.
s9
What is needed is legality and openness. Explicit rules, which clearly
prohibit some forms of pressure and permit others, can be easily evaluated;
if outcomes are not acceptable, the rules can be adjusted.
D. The Burden of Uncertainty
A proposal for law reform of this kind can rarely be demonstrated to be
correct. It remains possible for someone whose empirical estimates. differ
from ours to claim that coercive interrogation should be flatly prohibited, on
rule-consequentialist grounds. Such a person might claim that there are raw
empirical differences between coercive interrogation and other coercive
practices that law addresses through ordinary ex ante regulation (as opposed
to either strict prohibition or the scheme of ex post pardons, nullification,
and the like). Perhaps, for example, extrajudicial killing is very often neces
sary, as a factual matter, while coercive interrogation is rarely so, again as a
factual matter. Note also, however, that legal policy should take account of

87.

See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 1486-87, 1504-05.

88. See Human Rights Watch, Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestin
ian Authority Territories, in WORLD REPORT 2003, at 459, 464 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/
mideast5.html ("On September 4, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel reported that there
appeared to be a 'gradual reversion to the use of torture' despite the September 1999 High Court
decision outlawing its use. While the extent of their use was unclear, methods outlawed by the High
Court but reportedly used during interrogation included exposure to extremes of temperature, sleep
deprivation, the requirement to remain in an enforced position for extended periods, and intense
psychological pressure.") The report mentioned above may be found on the Internet at Public Com
mittee Against Torture in Israel, http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/publications.asp?menu=5&
submenu=l (last viewed Oct. 3 1 , 2005).
89. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility and Accountability Is Worse Than
With It, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 326 (2003); cf Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Pre
venting Torture of Suspected Terrorists, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 596, 604 ( 1 997) (arguing that a nominal
ban on coercive interrogation could have perverse effects by driving interrogation underground).
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the expected costs and benefits of official action, which is a function not
only of the frequency of relevant events but also of their costs and benefits
when they do happen to occur. The expected benefits of coercive interroga
tion might be equal to or greater than those of extrajudicial killing, if
coercive interrogation, while rarely useful, saves many more lives when it is
useful.
Given the factual uncertainties, it is incumbent upon those who oppose
coercive interrogation to explain why the right regime is either of the alter
natives: a flat ban on coercive interrogation, which we have criticized as an
implausible comer solution, or the OAF regime of "prohibition" plus ex post
relief, which we have criticized as both undesirable and unstable. Even if
one believes that coercive interrogation is rarely warranted, the most sensi
ble approach, within the framework of our proposal, would simply be to
tighten the relevant standards to the point where the benefits of licensing
coercive interrogation exceed the costs. Coercive interrogation could be lim
ited to known members of designated terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, or
limited to cases in which more than ten lives will certainly be saved if the
information is extracted; penalties for officials who violate the rules in un
reasonable or bad-faith ways, and who are thus stripped of immunity, could
be made more severe.
In the face of empirical uncertainty, the simplest starting point is to as
sume that law should regulate coercive interrogation within the same type of
framework law uses to regulate similar activities. There might indeed be a
difference between coercive interrogation and other coercive practices, but
there is no a priori reason to assume so, absent proof. Opponents of legaliza
tion-in our ordinary sense of legalization, as opposed to the self
underrnining OAF sense-bear the burden of showing that coercive interro
gation should be treated differently, and they have not carried that burden.
IV. WHY Is COERCIVE INTERROGATION TABOO ?
We have emphasized throughout that coercive interrogation can inflict
serious harms; that officials are commonly licensed, in ordinary legal sys
tems, to inflict serious harms under suitable regulation; and that there is no
good reason to treat coercive interrogation differently. Our argument has
been strictly normative, because it is quite clear that coercive interrogation
is indeed treated differently than other serious harms, as a matter of prevail
ing positive law. Why is this so? Here we offer some brief speculations
about why coercive interrogation is taboo.
A. Mistaken Generalization
The simplest idea is that the taboo on coercive interrogation is just a
conceptual blunder, a kind of mistaken generalization from the moral con
demnation of other practices that modem legal systems justifiably
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90
condemn. One sort of faulty generalization might occur across subcategories
of "torture." The actual practices of coercive interrogation bear a family re
semblance to forms of torture that are used to intimidate, terrorize, or oppress.
The failure to draw relevant moral, legal, and policy distinctions between
these different practices produces a legal regime that condemns coercive inter
rogation along with practices that have no conceivable justification.
Another sort of faulty generalization might reflect the emotional force of
highly salient historical episodes. The Spanish Inquisition used torture in the
service of religious oppression; Nazi doctors used torture in the service of
racist ideology. The inference from "these episodes of torture are unjustifi
able" to "torture is unjustifiable" is natural, but invalid. Pacifism cannot be
derived from the premise that some wars have been unjust; no more can a
general ban on torture in the sense of coercive interrogation be derived from
the historical use of torture in the sense of sadistic punishment.
B. Moral Heuristics
By itself, the idea of mistaken generalization is unsatisfactory. Why ex
actly do such conceptual errors occur? A possible mechanism here involves
91
moral heuristics. In evaluating questions of fact, boundedly rational indi
viduals acting with limited information and cognitive capacities use
heuristics, or rules of thumb, that sometimes misfire. By extension, bound
edly rational individuals often use heuristics to make moral judgments, and
those judgments will sometimes misfire as well. Consider, as one possible
moral heuristic, the principle advanced by Henry Shue and discussed in Part
I: never inflict pain on a defenseless person. In the run of cases, in which
pain is inflicted for sadistic or oppressive purposes, the heuristic works well.
In an identifiable subclass of cases, however, where inflicting pain on the
defenseless through coercive interrogation saves real lives, the heuristic pro
92
duces moral results that very few wish to defend.
Here the parallelism with evaluation of fact breaks down; even in this
subclass of cases, Shue's principle is not demonstrably wrong in the same
way that an error of fact is demonstrably wrong. To say the least, however,
the moral arguments that would be needed to justify Shue's principle in that
subclass of cases are far more complex, and less impressive, than in the run
of cases covered by the heuristic. Even if the heuristic happens to produce
morally defensible outcomes across the whole range of cases-and we saw
in Part I that even Shue flinches from the implications of his principle when

90.
On morality, consequentialism and mistaken generalization, see Jonathan B aron, Non
consequentialist Decisions, 1 7 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. I ( 1 994).
91.
(2004).

See id. ; Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1 556

92. This seems to be similar to Mark Osiel's view that torture is taboo because people don't
want to acknowledge that such horrifying behavior may be socially justified under certain condi
tions, and that "normal" people are fully capable of it. See MARK J. OsIEL, MASS ATROCITY,
ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT 1 5 5-60 (2001). He does not, however, explain why this
should be the case.
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lives can be saved by coercive interrogation-it produces those outcomes
fortuitously, on morally unsatisfactory grounds. In this sense, the heuristic
can be said to misfire even if we bracket large and controversial questions
about morality.
C. Judgment Falsification, Cascades and Herding
People often say, in sweeping terms, that torture (and by subsumption
coercive interrogation) is in some general sense "evil" or "wrong." People
want to be well thought of by others, want to be seen to stand on the right
side of charged moral questions, and tend to follow the moral judgments of
others if they are themselves unsure what morality requires . Perhaps these
phenomena are linked. More specifically, we speculate that (1) of those who
have thought about the range of possible cases, more people actually ap
prove of coercive interrogation (in some cases) than publicly admit they
approve of coercive interrogation; and (2) many people have not really
thought about the issues at all, and simply follow prevailing moral codes.
93
The first possibility is an instance of judgment falsification. The con
cern for reputation, social influences, and the fear of ostracism produce
dynamics that drive a wedge between publicly expressed judgments and
privately held judgments. To openly condone coercive interrogation is to
condone a form of torture, and no one wants to condone that. In private,
however, many of the same people may believe that coercive interrogation
should be permitted in some circumstances. Our point is not that privately
held moral views are authentic while publicly expressed ones are not, nor
that privately held views are more likely than public ones to track what mo
rality indeed requires. But to the extent law tends to reflect publicly
expressed judgments more than privately held views, law may condemn
torture more strongly, and in more sweeping terms, than do the private
judgments of citizens.
The second possibility is an instance of herding, or of opinion cas
94
cades. On issues of fact or morality, where people do not know what to
think, lack the time or inclination to think for themselves, or know that oth
ers may have insights they lack, people may quite reasonably decide to
follow the judgments of others. Those others may in tum be following the
judgments of others, and so on. Under certain conditions, almost everyone
may subscribe to a given moral view that almost nobody has thought
through, or would hold on fuller reflection. Coercive interrogation follows
this pattern, it seems to us. People's initial j udgments about the imperrnissi
bility of coercive interrogation, as a matter of morality and law, are sharp
and strongly avowed, but tend to become far weaker and more nuanced after
discussion and reflection. The sweeping condemnation of coercive interro-

93. By extension from preference falsification. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PuBLIC
LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 4-15 ( 1 995).
94. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 1 10 YALE L.J. 7 1 ,
8 1 (2000).
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gation embodied in current law looks like an artifact of past opinion cas
cades, and might dissolve rather easily under changed circumstances or
upon further debate.
Taboos come and go; none is eternal. A strong taboo once condemned
abortion, which no one cared openly to defend; today there are rapidly wan
ing taboos against euthanasia, and against gay marriage. Bracketing the
question which of these practices is morally permissible, the constant flux of
social taboos rebuts a common presumption that there must be some deep
moral logic to taboos, such as the one condemning all forms of coercive
interrogation. Perhaps there is sometimes or often no such logic; perhaps
taboos often rest on fortuitous constellations of historical circumstances that
can be destabilized by new circumstances, or even by reasoned argument.
CONCLUSION
Our aim is not to praise coercive interrogation, which is a grave evil in
any reasonable moral view. All we suggest is that law should treat coercive
interrogation the way it treats other grave evils. Law has a typical or base
line regulatory strategy for coping with grave evils that sometimes produce
greater goods. That strategy involves a complex regulatory regime of rules
with-exceptions, involving a prohibition on official infliction of serious
harms, permission to inflict such harms in tightly cabined circumstances, an
immunity regime that requires officials to follow the rules in good faith but
protects them if they do so, and review procedures to reduce error and en
hance transparency. In this baseline regime, the circumstances in which
serious harms may be inflicted are specified ex ante, rather than being remit
ted solely to the discretionary mercy of j uries, judges, and the executive
after the fact. Contrary to the academic consensus, we see no plausible rea
son for treating coercive interrogation differently.
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